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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
behalf of the employee, as trustee of the beneficiary, where there was
a breach of the union contract.18 An employee under contract, if
discharged before termination without cause, may recover damages
up to the date of termination.1 4  Obviously, where the union contract
is for two years and discharge is dependent on conditions precedent,
the employees must be kept for two years if these conditions are not
present and ought to recover damages if discharged before. Dam-
ages were recovered when an employer discharged an employee be-
fore presenting the case to the Arbitration Board as agreed upon
with the union, although there was no definite period for the duration
of the contract.' 5 Likewise, where two weeks' notice was required
before discharge and it was not given, recovery was had for this
period.' 6 As the dissenting opinion stated, the recitals were plainly
for the benefit of the employees, and the plaintiff should have based
his action on this theory. The plaintiff should have amended his
complaint, asking recovery as a beneficiary, and he would have un-
doubtedly been allowed to go to trial to determine whether the con-
ditions for dismissal were present.
L.S.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-BANKRUPTCY-VEHICLE AND TIAFFIC
LAW-REVOCATION OF LICENSE.--This is a suit to restrain appellee
(defendant) from enforcing a suspension of the appellant's operator's
license. The complaint alleges that the order suspending the license
was issued May 29, 1940, pursuant to Section 94-b of the Vehicle
and Traffic Law of New York,' upon receipt by the appellee from
Is Barth v. Addie Co., 271 N. Y. 31, 2 N. E. (2d) 34 (1936).
14Denniston v. Finnegan, 174 App. Div. 8, 160 N. Y. Supp. 5 (4th Dep't
1916) ; Cottone v. Murray's, 138 App. Div. 874, 123 N. Y. Supp. 420 (1st Dep't
1910).
15 Moore v. Illinois Central Ry., 180 Miss. 276, 176 So. 593 (1937).
16 See note 14, supra.
1 This section, when originally added to the article (L. 1929, c. 695), and
despite subsequent amendments (L. 1930, c. 398; L. 1931, c. 669; L. 1934,
c. 438), provided, in part, for the suspension of the operator's license and
registration certificate of any person against whom a judgment was obtained
because of injury to person or property sustained through the operation of a
motor vehicle if said judgment was not satisfied within fifteen days after
certification of the judgment, its finality and non-payment, to the commissioner
of motor vehicles by the county clerk. It directed the commissioner to suspend
the license for three years, unless the judgment be satisfied or discharged in
the meantime, except by a discharge it bankruptcy. (Italics mine.) On May
4, 1936 the section was amended (L. 1936, cc. 293, 448, 771) and a proviso
added that upon the cieditor's written consent, the debtor might be allowed a
license and registration for six months from date of such consent, and there-
after until the consent was revoked in writing, if debtor gave proof of his
financial ability to respond in damages. On May 31, 1939 (L. 1939, c. 618) a
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the clerk of the Supreme Court of Albany County of a transcript of
a judgment accompanied by evidence of its finality and non-payment.
Said judgment was rendered against appellant in the sum of $5,138.25
in an action to recover damages for personal injuries caused by appel-
lant's operation of an automobile. It is further alleged that appellant
was adjudicated a bankrupt on June 21, 1940 and it is admitted that
the judgment debt was proveable and discharged. 2 The complaint
charges that Section 94-b violates the "due process" clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution 3 and is rendered
void by Section 17 of the Bankruptcy Act.4 Upon the hear-
ing of a motion based upon the bill and answer, the injunction was
denied and the bill dismissed.8  Held, affirmed.6  Section 94-b does
not conflict with Bankruptcy Act Section 17, nor does it violate the
Fourteenth Amendment. It is merely an enforcement of permissible
state policy pertaining to the safety of its citizens.7 Reitz v. Mealy,
Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 314 U. S. 33, 62 Sup. Ct. 24
(1941).
The statute in question was not designed as a benefit to the
judgment-creditor merely, but to enforce a public policy, viz., irre-
sponsible drivers shall not injure other persons with impunity. The
effect of the statute makes the license privilege a form of protection
against damage to the public inflicted through licensee's negligence. 8
It does not inflict a deprivation of rights without "due process of
law" and is, therefore, not obnoxious to the Fourteenth Amendment.
This view has been favored in prior decisions of New York and for-
eign courts.9 Appellant's contention that Section 17 of the Bank-
further amendment made it the duty of the county clerk to certify the judg-
ment only upon the written demand of the creditor or his attorney. (Italics
mine.)
(N. Y. VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW § 94 has been repealed and superseded
by N. Y. MOTOR VEHIcLE SA.ETY-REsPONsmnaTY AcT [L. 1941, c. 872, § 1,
eff. Jan. 1, 1942]. Section 94-b, under consideration in the instant case, is now
found in §§ 94-b, 94-c, 94-g, 94-h, 94-i.)
2 The appearance of judgments, arising out of automobile accidents, among
individual bankrupts' schedules of liabilities has been common. CAUSES OF
BUsINESs FAiLuRus OF INDiVmUALs IN NEW JERSEY IN 1929-1930, U. S. Dep't
of Commerce, Don. Comm. Series No. 54, pp. 25, 26 (1931); CAUSES OF
COMMERCAL BANKUPTCI S, id., No. 69, pp. 14-16 (1932); CAUSES OF BANK-
RUPT CIEs AMONG CONSUMERS, id., No. 82, pp. 14, 15 (1933). See also Lewis
v. Roberts, 267 U. S. 467, 45 Sup. Ct. 357 (1925).
3 U. S. COxST. Amend. 14.
' 11 U. S. C. §35; 11 U. S. C. A. §35.
5 34 F. Supp. 532 (N. D. N. Y. 1940).6 Mr. Justice ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the Court. Mr. Justice
BLAcK, Mr. Justice BYRNEs and Mr. Justice JAcKsoN dissented with Mr.
Justice DoUGLAs.
7 Cf. Sproles v. Binford, 286 U. S. 374, 388-389, 52 Sup. Ct 581 (1932);
Standard Oil Co. v. Marysville, 279 U. S. 582, 586, 49 Sup. Ct. 430 (1929);
Morris v. Duby, 274 U. S. 135, 47 Sup. Ct. 548 (1927).8 Munz v. Harnett, 6 F. Supp. 158 (S. D. N. Y. 1933).
9 Munz v. Harnett, 6 F. Supp. 158 (S. D. N. Y. 1933); State v. Price,
49 Ariz. 19, 63 P. (2d) 653, 108 A. L. R. 1156 (1937) ; Multer v. State Road
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ruptcy Act is violated presents a more forceful argument. In New
York, the decisional law is conflicting.10 The Court reaffirms the
position taken by the district court that it need not pass upon the
validity of the 1936 and 1939 amendments upon the theory that the
1939 amendment was not retroactive and the judgment should or
would have been certified to the commissioner prior to the effective
date of said amendment; the question of the constitutionality of the
1936 amendment is tactfully avoided on the ground that the judgment-
creditor did not seek to invoke it. It is well-settled that questions of
constitutionality are not undertaken unless unavoidable."- The doc-
trine, however, must have its reasonable limitations and courts should
not essay a studied attempt to avoid delicate issues of constitutional
controversy when to do so would be to quit the realm of realism.
Lex phis laudatur quando ratione probatur. The sound dissenting
opinion of Mr. Justice DOUGLAS evinces an awareness of the practical
effect of the 1939 amendment which should not have escaped the
comment of the Court's majority opinion.' 2 It seems inescapable that
the 1939 amendment has provided the judgment-creditor with a for-
midable and effective weapon with which to coerce payment from the
bankrupt-debtor. The amendment gives such creditor the arbitrary
power to enforce payment of a debt which has been discharged as a
proveable debt in bankruptcy proceedings and thereby would seem to
contravene the purpose of the Bankruptcy Act.' 3 The problem lends
itself aptly to legislative amendment.' 4
The Court's contention that the ultimate decision would be un-
changed even should the amendments be declared unconstitutional 15
Comm., 119 W. Va. 312, 193 S. E. 549, 194 S. E. 270 (1937) ; Garford Trucking,
Inc. v. Hoffman, 114 N. J. L. 522, 177 AUt. 882 (1935) ; Sheehan v. Division of
Motor Vehicles, 140 Cal. App. 200, 35 P. (2d) 359 (1934) ; Watson v. Division
of Motor Vehicles, 212 Cal. 279, 298 Pac. 481 (1931) ; Opinion of the Justices,
251 Mass. 617, 147 N. E. 680 (1925) ; 5 Am. JuR. 593, § 158; 108 A. L. R. 1162.
2o See In re Perkins, 3 F. Supp. 697 (N. D. N. Y. 1933) holding that
N. Y. VEHICLE AND TRAmc LAW § 94-b defeats the purpose of the Bankruptcy
Act and is therefore invalid. Contra: Munz v. Harnett, 6 F. Supp. 158 (S. D.
N. Y. 1933) holding that § 94-b is not violative of either the Fourteenth
Amendment or Bankruptcy Act § 17 because a discharge in bankruptcy is not a
satisfaction of the debt, but only a bar to its collection.
116 C. J. S. § 94.
22 The view of the dissenting opinion is ably defended in Justice CoopER's
dissenting opinion in the district court, 34 F. Supp. 532, 535.
'a Congress envisioned for the adjudicated bankrupt "a new opportunity in
life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and discour-
agement of pre-existing debt". Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U. S. 234, 244,
54 Sup. Ct 695, 699 (1934).
14 As to the curative effect, if any, of the new statute (L. 1941, c. 872, § 1,
eff. Jan. 1, 1942) see, particularly, § 94-g.
15 New York favors the rule that an unconstitutional amendment does not
invalidate the entire statute, but the unconstitutional amendment is brutumfidmen and drops out as though never passed. People ex rel. Alpha Portland
Cement Co. v. Knapp, 230 N. Y. 48, 129 N. E. 202 (1920) ; People v. C. Klinck
Packing Co., 214 N. Y. 121, 108 N. E. 278 (1915) ; In re Markland, 203 N. Y.
158, 96 N. E. 427 (1911). See VEHIcLE AND TRAi'rc LAW § 94-na (added
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is necessarily obiter dictum. The decision is noteworthy insofar as it
declines to follow the rule of In re Perkins'0 but rather lends judi-
cial weight to the precedent of Munz v. Harnett.17
M.F.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION
-LICENSE FOR MASSAGE OPERATORS.-The plaintiffs, Jenny Worm-
sen and Dagmar Larsen-Bak, have applied for an order directing the
Commissioner of Licenses of New York City to accept their applica-
tions and to permit them to take the prescribed examination for mas-
sage operators. Plaintiffs allege that they filed proper applications
for licenses in November, 1940, and that these applications complied
with all the rules and regulations relating to such. On March 21,
1941, the applications were denied on the sole ground that the ap-
plicants had not been citizens of the United States for at least two
years.' When the applications were filed the Administrative Code
provided that the granting of licenses as massage operators is limited
to citizens or to those who have regularly declared their intention to
become citizens.2 Before the applications had been accepted, the Ad-
ministrative Code was amended to restrict the granting of licenses to
those who had been citizens two years.3 Petitioners urge that such
a provision is an arbitrary, unreasonable and discriminatory exercise
of police power, violative of the Constitution of the United States and
the State of New York.4 Held, application granted. Wormsen, et al.
v. Moss, 177 Misc. 19, 29 N. Y. S. (2d) 798 (1941).
A person's business or occupation is property within the consti-
tutional provisions as to due process of law. The guaranty of due
L. 1941, c. 872, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1942) which, no doubt, was influenced by the
decisions in the Reitz and Perkins cases.
16 3 F. Supp. 697 (N. D. N. Y. 1933).
17 6 F. Supp. 158 (S. D. N. Y. 1933).
I Petitioner Wormsen had acquired citizenship in February, 1941, and
petitioner Larsen-Bak had been examined for admission to citizenship in May,
1941, and was awaiting her final papers at the time of trial.
2 ADMINISTRATIVE CODE § 773a-1.0.
3 ADMINISTRATIVE CODE § B32-195.0, as amended by Loc. Laws 1941, No.
15 and § 773a-1.0.
A U. S. CoNsT. AMEND. XIV, § 1. "* * * nor shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
N. Y. CoNsT. art. I, §§ 6, 11. ""No person shall be deprived of life, lib-
erty, or property without due process of law." "No person shall be denied the
equal protection of the laws of this state or any subdivision thereof."5 Angelopoulos v. Battorff, 76 Cal. App. 621, 245 Pac. 447 (1926); Lasdon
v. Hallihan, 377 fII. 187, 36 N. E. (2d) 227 (1941) ; Bogni v. PerottL, 224 Mass.
152, 112 N. E. 853 (1916); Sinquefield v. Valentine, 159 Miss. 144, 132 So. 81
(1931).
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